Analysis // by John Changiz VafaiThe third way in Egypt
The dilemma the United States is facing in Egypt is often compared with the one encountered by the United States during the Iranian Revolution of 1979; pundits argue that the alternative in Egypt is between a corrupt but pro-Western dictatorship and a repressive religious autocracy; in the United States, worries have been expressed that the post-Mubarak transitional government, led by an intellectual or secular leader such el Baradei, will be vanquished in favor of Islamic autocracy as was the case with Shapur Bakhtiar, the last secular prime minister of Iran; this comparison misstates the history and presents a false choice
In the face of a vehement opposition and riots in Egypt against the regime of President Hosni Mubarak — demonstration which led, on 11 February, to his resignation — there is a question that has to be addressed which goes to the core of U.S. policy in the Middle East and North Africa. The fundamental question is: Would it be possible to change the current government in Egypt, represented by the corrupt and dictatorial regime of Mubarak, without facilitating the coming to power of an even more repressive autocracy embodied in Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood? The short answer to this question is, yes.
The dilemma the United States is facing in Egypt is often compared with the one encountered by the United States during the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Pundits argue that the alternative in Egypt is between a corrupt but pro-Western dictatorship and a repressive religious autocracy. The logical conclusion from such scenario is that upon the departure of Mubarak, the Egyptian uprising will be hijacked by the Muslim Brotherhood with its systematic policy, and history since 1928, of organized religious Jihadist and martyrdom doctrine.
According to this logic, at the end, the Muslim Brotherhood will fill the vacuum of power by turning Egypt into an Islamic theocracy. Omar Suleiman, the vice president of Egypt has expressed fears that the Muslim Brotherhood posed a serious threat to security of Egypt by influencing and mobilizing the public. In the United States, worries have been expressed that the post-Mubarak transitional government, led by an intellectual or secular leader such el Baradei, will be vanquished in favor of Islamic autocracy as was the case with Shapur Bakhtiar, the last secular prime minister of Iran. This comparison misstates the history and presents a false choice. .
The choice in Egypt today – as was the choice in Iran thirty years ago – is not necessarily between an authoritarian regime, supported by the military on the one hand, and a repressive religious autocracy. There is a third way.
There are, of course, many similarities between the pre-Islamic Iran of 1979 and the present Egypt. In case of Iran, the royal family was profoundly disliked by the majority of the Iranians, especially by the young and educated. In Iran of 1979, as in present Egypt, the secret service (SAVAK) was an instrument of government repression, atrocities, torture, and the violation of fundamental individual rights. The military, on the other hand, was
