Insider threatInsider threat problem topic of a GovSec panel
A recent batch of leaked cables from the State Department reveals concerted efforts by terrorist organizations to obtain WMDs and the danger that “insider threats” pose at facilities that house radioactive materials; in September 2009 two employees at the Rossing Uranium Mine in Namibia smuggled nearly half a ton of yellowcake out of the facility; the pair was eventually caught, but 550 pounds were not intercepted and have gone missing; another cable expressed fears that an employee working in one of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities could “gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon”; these incidents are but two examples of the growing danger insiders, motivated by money or ideology, pose
The Government Security Conference starts 29 March 2011 // Source: 101com.com
It used to be the case that by “security” (as in: “We should secure the facility”) people meant protection against outsiders. The answer involved fences and guards and, more recently, biometric identification to make sure that those who came into the facility, or who were about to enter a sensitive area within the facility, were indeed who they claimed they were.
This is no longer enough, as attention has shifted to the risks posed by insiders. Here are a couple of examples.
A recent batch of leaked cables from the State Department reveals concerted efforts by terrorist organizations to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the danger that “insider threats” pose at facilities that house radioactive materials.
One of the cables, obtained by WikiLeaks and released by the Telegraph on 1 February 2011, found that “although there was a limited assessed capability for al Qaeda and other groups to acquire WMD, the intent was clearly present, and there were ongoing credible reports of attempts to recruit the needed expertise.”
The cable was a summary of a North Atlantic Council meeting held 28 January 2009, and went on to say that “a ‘dirty’ radiological IED program was assessed to be under active consideration by al Qaeda.”
Far easier to obtain and build than a nuclear weapon, a dirty bomb is constructed by simply attaching conventional explosives to radioactive material. When detonated the nuclear material is spread across a wide area, potentially killing hundreds in the initial blast, sickening many more with radiation poisoning, and leaving the surrounding area contaminated.
Matthew Bunn, author of the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s report Securing the Bomb, is particularly worried about employees at nuclear sites stealing radioactive materials.
“The biggest concern of major production, to my mind, is theft from the places where the material is being handled in bulk — the plants that produce it, convert it to metal, fabricate it into bomb parts, and so on,” he said.
Bunn said that “all but one of the real thefts” of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium “were insider thefts from bulk-handling facilities — that’s where you can squirrel a little bit away without the loss being detected.”
Elena Sokova, assistant director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, expressed similar concerns citing an incident in September 2009 in which two employees at the Rossing Uranium Mine in Namibia smuggled nearly half a ton of uranium concrete powder, or “yellowcake,” out of the
