IDF to issue tender for second generation of proprietary wireless network

The way the vaunted Israel Defense Forces (IDF) acquitted itself during the July-August 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah left much to be desired. Three generals have already tendered their resignations — among them General Dan Halutz, the chief of staff during the war — and a series of investigative committees have been looking into, and harshly criticizing, every aspect of the preparation for and conduct of the war (just watch for the political earthquake which will accompany the release, in late April, of the interim report of the Vingorad Commission, charged with looking into the government’s handling of the siuation and its decision making processes).

One component of the Israeli military machine which fell short of its promise was Vered Harim (mountain rose), the encrypted cellular communication system which Motorola Israel built for the IDF. The idea was to equip every officer — initially from the level of a battalion commander and up — with a handset which would allow them to communicate in real time, exchange notes, send images of enemy concnetrations, have video-conferences over maps and battle plans, and more. The current system’s reliance on narrow band, however, limited the volume and type of information which could be trnasmitted, and officers found the system nearly useless.

Now, the Israeli Ministry of Defense has issued an RFI for a second generation of the system, aimed to correct ther many flaws and limitations found in the current version. A senior government official was blunt in describing the current system as too expensive and too old.

Vered Harim was first used operationally in summer 2005, during the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Despite its inherent limitations, some officers were able to use the system during the 2006 war in Lebanon to transmit classified information from the front to tacital computers in mobile command posts which commanded the front-line units. To their chagrin, however, officers found out that the system could not be used for SMS or instant messaging. Moreover, the handsets came with Latin alphabet keys, so Israeli commanders had to communicate with the higher-ups and with each other in English. Now, English language is mandatory in Israeli high schools, but many commanders complained that trying accurately to transmit complex battle situations and nuanced assessments of enemy tactics in grammatical English, and do all that while being pinned under enemy fire and barking orders to your troops in Hebrew, was just too much. Moreover, the handset itself is bulky and difficult to carry and handle.

The most serious flaw, though, is the fact that the narrow band prevents users from effectively trasmitting important battle-related information. For example, a forward reconnaissance unit for an artilery battalion cannot transmit a map with arrows pointing to valuable enemy targets that should be attacked. Transmiting a picture of a building in which terrorists are hiding may take several minutes, during which the terrorists may escape. Transmitting strweaming video is impossible.

The system had had its critics from the start. Many argue that the cost of its developments — some $150 million — would have been better spent on a private-sector contractor already accustomed to providing high-quality wireless contents to customers. The IDF insists the the original idea was sound, and the next generation of the system will do the job.

—read more on Vered Harim in this Red Orbit report; and see this Defense Update summary