U.S. tries to calm Iraq’s anger over Ash Carter’s “will to fight” comment

The key differences among the United States, Iraq, and Iran:

• The al-Abadi government (although not all of Iraq’s Shi’a factions) wants a much larger U.S. ground presence, and a more robust U.S. involvement in ground operations, while the training and equipping of a more effective Iraqi military by the United States continues. A larger U.S. miitary presence on the ground in Iraq and a greater involvement of U.S. soldiers in the fight against ISIS would rapidly reverse ISIS gains and, before too long, end ISIS presence in Iraq altogether. This U.S. presence will also reassure Iraq’s Sunnis, leading them to take a stronger stand against ISIS, and will also embolden  elements in Iraq who are opposed to Iran’s growing influence in the country. Moreover, at a time when the United States is negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran, a growing American presence in Iraq would reassure Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and Egypt of U.S. commitment to checking both Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions and the spread of jihadist Islam. This approach, however, is a non-starter:  A substantial increase in U.S. millitary presence in Iraq, and involvement in a ground war against ISIS, are unaccepptable to the Obama administration and to the American public more generally. 
• The Iranians object to a larger U.S. ground presence, and are also suspicious of a larger Iraqi military trained and equipped by the United States. They want the al-Abadi government to rely more heavily on Iran-trained and equipped Shi’a militias in the fight against ISIS. These militias have so far not performed very well against ISIS, but the Iranians believe that with more recruitment and training, and with deeper involvement of Iranian officers and Hezbollah fighters, these militias will not only be more effective in the fight against ISIS, but will allow the Shi’a government in Baghdad a better control of the Sunni tribes in Anbar Province and will also keep the Kurds in check. Iran is worried that a large U.S.-trained Iraqi army will weaken Iran’s influence in Iraq.
• The Obama administration rejects any substantial increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq (now about 4,000), and rejects U.S. involvement in large ground operations (small-scale Special Forces operations, though, are being conducted). The United States views the air war against ISIS as a means to keep ISIS in check while the United States helps Iraq build and train a more effective military. The main worry of the United States is that any sign of a growing involvement of Iran in Iraq beyond the current level, and any more reliance of al-Abadi government on Iran-trained Shi’a militias in the fight against ISIS, will make Iran’s Sunni tribes even more reluctant to join in the fight against ISIS, and may push many Sunnis to side with the Islamist militants. A growing involvement of Iran in the fight against ISIS in Iraq would also complicate the calculations of Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Gulf States in their fight against ISIS: These countries have shown their willingness to confront the Islamists militarily, but they are not going to do so on behalf of an exclusivist Shi’a government in Baghdad, let alone on behalf of Iran. The Obama administration’s policy, then, is based on using air power against ISIS to buy time for an effective Iraqi army to be trained and quipped, while urging the al-Abadi government to limit the role of the Iran-trained Shi’a militias in fighting against ISIS in Sunni areas, where these militias are viewed as a tool of Shi’a oppression rather than as liberators. The advantage of the Obama administration’s policy relative to other options is that it does not involve a heavy American presence on the ground and is thus acceptable to American public opinion. There are disdvanatges, though: The administration’s approach is not likely to yield results in the short run, so it allows ISIS to make gains on the ground, which the organization’s savvy media machine can translate into effective recruitment and public relations tools. The administration’s policies are also based on a delicate balancing act which may be difficult to execute over time in a volatile region.