Nuclear weaponsDoes Iran deal advance or undermine global nonproliferation efforts? Experts disagree
The White House already points to the potential Iran deal as one of the highlights of Obama’s legacy, as it fulfills both the Obama doctrine of advancing U.S. interests through engagement with America’s adversaries and the vision of a world gradually retreating from furthering nuclear weapons ambitions. Nuclear nonproliferation experts, however, question whether an Iranian nuclear deal, as laid out in the framework agreement reached last month, advances or sets back the nonproliferation agenda and Obama’s vision of ridding the world of nuclear threat.
In his 2009 speech on nuclear nonproliferation in Prague, President Barack Obama called on global leaders to strive for a world free of nuclear weapons. Today, Obama and his administration are negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran which, if signed by the end of June as expected, will emerge as the centerpiece of Obama’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The White House already points to the potential Iran deal as one of the highlights of Obama’s legacy, as it fulfills both the Obama doctrine of advancing U.S. interests through engagement with America’s adversaries and the vision of a world gradually retreating from furthering nuclear weapons ambitions.
Nuclear nonproliferation experts, however, question whether an Iranian nuclear deal, as laid out in the framework agreement reached last month, advances or sets back the nonproliferation agenda and Obama’s vision of ridding the world of nuclear threat.
The current Iranian nuclear program, if left unchecked, could cause the proliferation of nuclear ambitions across an already volatile Middle East. An agreement which verifiably constrains Iran’s nuclear advances for at least a decade and lengthens the “breakout” time Iran would need to build a bomb is a considerable achievement, supporters of the deal say.
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See also:
To prevent Iranian nukes, a negotiated deal better than a military strike: David Albright, 24 April 2015
How to verify a comprehensive Iran nuclear deal, 23 April 2015
P5+1, Iran agree on parameters of an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program, 3 April 2015
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“The greatest threat to the global nonproliferation regime is the threat of Iran getting nuclear weapons,” says Robert Einhorn, a former State Department special adviser for nonproliferation and arms control who is now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “If you believe, as I do, that this emerging deal will effectively preclude an Iranian nuclear capability for at least a decade and will put in place an effective monitoring regime to last beyond that into the future,” Einhorn adds, “then I think it’s a clear positive for nonproliferation.”
According to the Christian Science Monitor, opponents of an Iranian nuclear agreement say the deal risks opening a Pandora’s Box of proliferation because it accepts Iran’s uranium enrichment program. “The message this deal sends is that if Iran, which has violated any number of nuclear safeguards and doesn’t comply with the IAEA, can have an enrichment program, then anyone can,” says David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. “With this deal we’re going to have our work cut out for us if we want to keep enrichment technology from spreading in the Middle East,” he adds (Albright supports the deal as the best of the available realistic options. See “To prevent Iranian nukes, a negotiated deal better than a military strike: David Albright, HSNW, 24 April 2015).
Einhorn rejects the notion that an Iranian nuclear agreement would encourage other countries in the Middle East to pursue uranium enrichment programs. He points to the sanctions that have devastated the Iranian economy, saying as a result of those sanctions, “they’re going to be living under a terribly intrusive regime for 10-15 years.”
“So I’m not sure the Iranian model is going to be an enticing one for other countries,” he adds.
Albright notes that reaching an agreement with Iran was “necessary,” otherwise an Iranian nuclear bomb or another military intervention in the Middle East to prevent this outcome were inevitable. On the broader quest for global nonproliferation, an Iranian deal is a retreat, Albright says. “Essentially it sets back Obama’s vision set out in Prague in the sense that it lowers the limits on these dangerous technologies.”
White House officials note that the Iranian deal is not the only feature of Obama’s nonproliferation and disarmament policy. They point to the New START Treaty signed with Russian in 2010 and the nuclear security summits established by Obama to secure nuclear materials and prevent nuclear terrorism.
Still the Iranian deal is likely to be the achievement that makes or breaks Obama’s nonproliferation legacy. If the agreement sets off a uranium enrichment race in the Middle East, then Obama’s vision and deal with Iran would appear naive; but “if, when Obama leaves office, the Iran deal is in full implementation with Iran abiding by its constraints,” Einhorn says, “then I think rightly he could hold this up as a major enhancement of the global nonproliferation regime and a considerable step in moving forward the Prague agenda.”
