Nuclear risksHow to verify a comprehensive Iran nuclear deal

With the negotiation between the P5+1(the United States, European Union, Britain, France, Russia, and China) and Iran resuming yesterday (Wednesday) about a set of parameters for an eventual Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the shape of a final deal about Iran’s nuclear program has emerged. Many important provisions of a final deal, however, remain to be negotiated in the coming months.

The Washington, D.C.-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) says that a critical set of these provisions involves the adequacy of verification arrangements which would be in place to monitor Iran’s compliance with a deal. Tehran’s long history of violations, subterfuge, and non-cooperation requires extraordinary arrangements to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is indeed peaceful. A priority of the on-going negotiations is establishing legally binding measures guaranteeing this adequate verification.

Several measures are needed to ensure adequate verification in a long term deal:

1. Iran addressing the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s past and possibly on-going nuclear weapons work.  If no concrete progress is forthcoming by 1 July, a deal should not be signed. If Iran in good faith asks to delay demonstrating concrete progress until after a deal is signed, it should not receive any sanctions relief from the United States and European Union until it fulfills this commitment, along with providing a road map on resolving the rest of the IAEA’s PMD concerns. IAEA visits to Parchin and related sites, inspection of related equipment, and access to key individuals should be part of the demonstration of concrete progress as one of the key conditions for suspending EU and U.S. economic and financial sanctions.
2. The removal of UN Security Council resolutions should be tied to the long term resolution of the PMD file, a determination by the IAEA of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, and the demonstration of adequate verification arrangements on Iran’s industrial infrastructure, both military and civilian, related to the potential development of nuclear weapons.
3. UNSC sanctions or controls on proliferation sensitive goods need to continue indefinitely. These controls, along with a rigorously verified procurement channel, are a fundamental part of ensuring that Iran is not secretly outfitting undeclared nuclear facilities and activities.
4. Establishment of binding language guaranteeing the IAEA snap inspections, or anywhere, anytime inspections, and broader Iranian declarations about its activities than required in the Additional Protocol, lasting for longer than the reported term of a deal, at least until the IAEA has satisfactorily concluded its PMD investigation and several more years have passed wherein Iran is compliant with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations.

ISIS says that the evaluation of the adequacy of verification provisions remains a critical role of Congress. Toward that end, it makes sense for the P5+1 countries, along with the IAEA, and separately, Congress, to create a strong review process of the adequacy of the verification regime at one year, five years, and every five years afterwards for the duration of the major phasing arrangements in the deal.

David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security, testified yesterday (Wednesday) before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. His testimony, titled “Adequate Verification Under a Comprehensive Iran Nuclear Deal,” is available here.