Nuclear terrorismDrug cartels, terrorists may cooperate in smuggling materials for a nuclear device into U.S.
Detonating a nuclear device or dirty bomb in the United States has long been goal of terrorists groups including al-Qaeda. Doing so, however, would require access to nuclear materials and a way to smuggle them into the country. Experts note the nexus between drug organizations, crime groups, and violent extremists and the trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials. A new report points out that al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Colombia’s FARC are the three organizations with the motivation and capability to obtain a radiological or nuclear device.
Detonating a nuclear device or dirty bomb in the United States has long been goal of terrorists groups including al-Qaeda. Doing so, however, would require access to nuclear materials and a way to smuggle them into the country.
For now, considerable roadblocks exists that would prevent such a plan from coming into fruition, but Steven Sin, a senior researcher in the unconventional weapons and technology division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START), says that what seems like a plot in a spy thriller could become a real-life nightmare scenario.
According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), a radiological device, or dirty bomb, is a conventional explosive with radioactive materials such as Cesium 137 attached. A nuclear device, now limited to a few nation states, involves splitting the atoms of a radioactive material such as highly enriched uranium.
The Tampa Tribune reports that last week, Sin released a study about the nexus between drug organizations, crime groups, and violent extremists and the trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials. In it he points out that al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) are the three organizations with the motivation and capability to obtain a radiological or nuclear device. These groups, Sin explains, are hybrid organizations, a meld between the ideological and criminal, driven primarily by ideology and using crime to fund their ideological actions.
Of the three groups, only al-Qaeda and Hezbollah would be likely to use such a device in the United States. FARC makes a bulk of its money selling cocaine to users in the United States, and would not want to unleash a radioactive bomb on its best customers.
Still, Sin explains that while a drug trafficking organization may make too much money from the United States to want to help unleash chaos and disrupt business, a rogue high-ranking member of a drug trafficking group may use his or her position and the respective organization’s capability to smuggle radiological or nuclear devices into the United States on behalf of a terror group.
Should al-Qaeda or Hezbollah find a way to smuggle a radiological or nuclear weapon into the United States, the group would still have to get its hands on the device or nuclear material. The technical complexities, and its limits to a few nation states, make it unlikely that terrorist groups would obtain a nuclear weapon. Radioactive materials, on the other hand, which are useful for a dirty bomb, could be obtained from MRI and X-Ray scanners, but recent cases show that the quest still remains a challenge for terror groups. According to the NRC, “Since September 11, 2001, terrorist arrests and prosecutions overseas have revealed that individuals associated with al-Qaeda planned to acquire materials for a (dirty bomb) or radiological dispersal device (RDD).”
In 2004 British authorities arrested Dhiren Barot and seven associates on various charges, including conspiring to commit public nuisance by the use of radioactive materials. Barot admitted to plotting to bomb the New York Stock Exchange, the International Monetary Fund headquarters, and the World Bank, among other targets. In another 2004 case, British police arrested British national Salahuddin Amin and six associates on terrorism-related charges. According to the NRC, al-Qaeda linked-Amin “is accused of making inquiries about buying a ‘radioisotope bomb’ from the Russian mafia in Belgium.”
Neither Barot nor Amin’s plans came close to an operational stage, but they demonstrate “the continued interest of terrorists in acquiring and using radioactive material for malicious purposes,” the NRC points out.