TerrorismThe politics of (not) counting: why war on terror’s civilian toll matters
Since 2007, a growing body of literature has emerged from inside the U.S. military that stresses the importance of tracking civilian casualties on strategic rather than moral grounds. A key component of the counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN) developed under General David Petraeus’s auspices was that the United States needed to move away from enemy-centric operations and embrace a more population-centric approach. By focusing on winning the hearts and minds of ordinary people, it was argued that the insurgency’s support structure could be removed without having to confront them head-on. The overall aim is not to gain control of territory as you would in a conventional war, but to win the local population’s support by convincing them that you can protect and provide. Within this framework, civilians’ deaths become a strategic consideration rather than a purely legal one. Avoiding civilian casualties was not simply a matter of adhering to international law, but an essential part of winning the war. Lieutenant-General James L. Terry, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, recently admitted, however, that he had no idea how many civilians have died as a result of coalition airstrikes in the region. As well as being questionable on moral grounds, the refusal to count civilian casualties could be seen as a strategic mistake on the military’s own terms — fanning the flames of resentment in a region already in the midst of a violent war.
Lieutenant-General James L. Terry, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, recently admitted he had no idea how many civilians have died as a result of coalition airstrikes in the region.
In a briefing eerily reminiscent of the notorious “we don’t do body counts” remark by General Tommy Franks (the commander of U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq), Terry told reporters in December 2014 he was “tracking no civilian casualties” even though non-combatants are known to have been killed in at least two separate incidents.
The current failure to monitor civilians killed may seem unsurprising given the previous Bush administration’s rather glib attitude. Then-defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld was very good at deflecting criticisms of American forces. He claimed: “Responsibility for every single casualty in this war, be they innocent Afghans or innocent Americans, rests at the feet of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.”
Likewise, George W. Bush argued: “Saddam Hussein regards the Iraqi people as human shields, entirely expendable when their suffering serves his purposes.”
More worryingly, this attitude towards non-combatants was reflected in the kinds of operations undertaken and the types of weapons used, including cluster bombs.
The battle for hearts and minds
Since 2007, however, a growing body of literature has emerged from inside the U.S. military that stresses the importance of tracking civilian casualties on strategic rather than moral grounds.
A key component of the counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN) developed under General David Petraeus’s auspices was that the United States needed to move away from enemy-centric operations and embrace a more population-centric approach.
By focusing on winning the hearts and minds of ordinary people, it was argued that the insurgency’s support structure could be removed without having to confront them head-on. The overall aim is not to gain control of territory as you would in a conventional war, but to win the local population’s support by convincing them that you can protect and provide.
Within this framework, civilians’ deaths become a strategic consideration rather than a purely legal one. Avoiding civilian casualties was not simply a matter of adhering to international law, but an essential part of winning the war. Sarah Sewall, a key architect of COIN, argued: “… killing the civilian is no longer just collateral damage … [it] undermines the counterinsurgent’s goals.”
