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RadicalizationEuropeans try counter-radicalization hotlines to combat Islamists’ appeal

Published 19 January 2015

Much attention has been given to Islamic State recruitment efforts targeting Europe’s Muslim population, and now a coalition of private and public sector groups are countering those recruitment efforts with preventative measures. Current counter-radicalization hotlines were launched after European governments effectively used them to de-radicalize neo-Nazis. Despite the success with skinheads, observers note that many hotlines for would-be Islamic terrorists do not seem to be effective, at least not yet.

Much attention has been given to Islamic State recruitment efforts targeting Europe’s Muslim population, and now a coalition of private and public sector groups are countering those recruitment efforts with preventative measures.

In the Netherlands, a group of volunteers operate the Dutch Radicalization Hotline. The telephone service offers parents and relatives of vulnerable youths support and insight to recognize when radicalization has begun to take hold in their communities.

To date, roughly 3,000 Western fighters have traveled to Syria to join a number of militant groups, mainly the Islamic State. About 700 of them are reportedly from France, but at least 500 militants are believed to be from Belgium and the Netherlands.

The Dutch hotline is different from many other counterterrorist hotlines in Europe because it is operated and funded without government support. The hotline is backed by the Moroccan Dutch community and focuses its resources on prevention, rather than self-reporting. The German government has operated its own anti-radicalization hotline since 2010, and last year, the Austrian and French government followed suit.

According to VICE News, current counter-radicalization hotlines were launched after European governments effectively used them to de-radicalize neo-Nazis. “They had a lot of people calling them,” Lorenzo Vidino, a specialist on European Islamic and political violence, tells VICE, “and a substantial number of those who called got out (of neo-Nazi communities).”

In terms of ideological (support),” Vidino explains, “it was (about) talking to former neo-Nazis themselves, who explain why the ideology’s flawed. It does help to talk to people who went through what you were going through yourself. In many cases, for the neo-Nazis, they help to provide relocation. It’s common to a lot of radicalization — a lot of it has to do with the environment you’re in. Maybe you want to get out, but if you live in a small (community), these are your friends, this is your social environment. It’s difficult to get out. You move to a new city. You make new friends.”

Vidino notes that despite the success with skinheads, many hotlines for would-be Islamic terrorists do not seem to be effective. The problem stems from a mistrust of unknown actors, specifically government institutions. Would-be callers fear that reaching out to anti-radicalization hotlines may identify them as at-risk individuals, subject to government surveillance.

Having government support doesn’t necessarily taint you and make you illegitimate in the eyes of the community,” Vidino stresses. “But not having the ties, you run fewer risks of being seen as the long arm of the secret services and so on.”

Denmark and parts of the United Kingdom have initiated comprehensive programs by which national and local government institutions fund community and religious efforts that address the social and economic roots of radicalization. Yet stories of radicalized Muslims in Europe and growing frustration within European Muslim communities have led many Europeans to believe those comprehensive efforts have failed.

It’s understandable (as a gut reaction),” Vidino says, “but we don’t have all the facts to make a judgment call on what works and what doesn’t.”

In the meantime, the Dutch hotlines, operated by community members with an intimate knowledge of the communities they serve and with no government affiliation, may be a breakthrough. “Unless they have (clearly) abysmal success rates, they provide a good complement to hard counter-terror measures,” Vidino says. “If the alternative is just not doing anything, I think (they’re) useful.”

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