Kurdish region“Independent” Kurds need Baghdad more than they’d like
Iraqi Kurds are in a unique position to declare independence in defiance of a seemingly powerless central government in Baghdad following the rapid disintegration of Iraq in the face of the Islamic State in Iraq and As-Sham (ISIS) onslaught. But is independence as simple as that, a fait accompli resulting from a series of unpredictable events? Unpalatable as it may sound to Iraqi Kurds, the KRG needs Baghdad far more than it is prepared to admit. By all means, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) should seek to leverage a better deal out of Baghdad — the Kurdish armed forces, or peshmerga, are vital to the fight against ISIS. In terms of full independence, though, the costs seem to outweigh the benefits at present.
Iraqi Kurds are in a unique position to declare independence in defiance of a seemingly powerless central government in Baghdad following the rapid disintegration of Iraq in the face of the Islamic State in Iraq and As-Sham (ISIS) onslaught. But is independence as simple as that, a fait accompli resulting from a series of unpredictable events?
Intense nationalists under normal circumstances — the kind of nationalism that only a people with existential angst can express — this sentiment has been ratcheted up exponentially since Kurdish armed forces or Peshmerga (“those who march unto death”) seized Kirkuk on 12 June. Many Kurds in the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) believe their hour of independence is finally at hand. They are likely to vote overwhelmingly to declare independence in the referendum their president, Massoud Barzani, has proposed.
The 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, which created artificial states in the Middle East to serve French and British imperial interests, is unravelling at startling speed in Iraq and Syria. The long-oppressed Kurdish population, divided between Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria, cannot but welcome this. They, along with the stateless Palestinians, were the ultimate losers of the post-World War One carve-up of the Ottoman Empire.
No-one can deny that the Kurds of Iraq suffered horribly under Saddam Hussein. The Anfal campaign in the late 1980s, in particular, is reputed to have killed over 100,000 Kurds, destroyed thousands of Kurdish villages, and created millions of refugees.
Can a Kurdish state support itself?
Amid the euphoria of seemingly inevitable independence, however, there seems to be surprisingly little public discussion about how everything might work in practice after independence. And what might be the consequences? This is especially the case given the parlous nature of governance in the KRG before the present crisis in Iraq, let alone the problems that might follow independence.
First, any attempt at secession will inevitably lead to conflict with Baghdad, possibly of the armed variety. It is difficult to recall any peaceful secession in recent memory, even for emergent sovereign states that had legal referendums and UN endorsement. The examples of East Timor and South Sudan are not cheery prospects to countenance.
