IraqIf Nouri al-Maliki stays in office, Iraq faces destructive descent into a long civil war
Throughout his two previous terms, Nouri al-Maliki managed to create various problems but failed to solve any of them. Instead of winning over the population of the heavily Sunni provinces, and through them Iraq’s wider Sunni community, al-Maliki’s Shiite-dominated government persistently alienated and discriminated against them. Before long, Sunni areas started to see protests, sit-ins and demonstrations against the policies of al-Maliki and his government. The prime minister’s response was to increase the presence of security and military forces, which were mainly staffed and headed by Shiite personnel. Thanks to his unwillingness to concede to the demands of the Sunni-majority provinces, instead resorting to the use of force, his struggle against the leaders of these provinces (and indeed most opposition Sunni leaders) reached the point of no return. Al-Maliki’s departure, and the formation of a government of national unity of technocrats that could put an end to corruption and at least restore basic services, could perhaps offer a chance for some stability. It would also help end the many disputes and problems al-Maliki has created with the Kurdish regional government, the Sunni provinces, and especially with his own Shiite coalition partners. His insistence on remaining in office will only hasten the start of a destructive and prolonged civil conflict — all too reminiscent of the catastrophe still unfolding across his country’s north-eastern border.
The fall of several Iraqi cities to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS, or Da’ish as it is known in Arabic), was a shocking turn of events — shocking, but not totally unexpected. Whatever Tony Blair says, if we look back at the disastrous U.S.-U.K. escapade of 2003 and the way it dismantled, destroyed and crippled the Iraqi state, it is clear we should always have expected something like this to happen.
The seeds of division and disintegration were sown as soon as the occupiers began looking at Iraq as simply a collection of people — Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, Assyrians, Sunnis and Shiites. Most dangerous of all, this understanding was enshrined in a controversial permanent constitution. The religious-sectarian-conservative parties that were allowed to return to Iraq and to dominate the political scene there all played a big part in accentuating these divisions.
The result was the dominance of sectarian Shiite parties, backed by Iran and the Kurdish parties — alienating the Sunni community, who were regarded as the backbone of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Laying down the law
Instead of winning over the population of the heavily Sunni provinces, and through them Iraq’s wider Sunni community, Nouri al-Maliki’s Shiite-dominated government persistently alienated and discriminated against them. Before long, Sunni areas started to see protests, sit-ins and demonstrations against the policies of al-Maliki and his government.
The prime minister’s response was to increase the presence of security and military forces, which were mainly staffed and headed by Shiite personnel. Thanks to his unwillingness to concede to the three provinces’ demands, instead resorting to the use of force, his struggle against the leaders of these provinces (and indeed most opposition Sunni leaders) reached the point of no return.
Attempts to subdue the population by military and security measures further alienated them from the government. It is therefore no surprise that Mosul, Tikrit and Ramadi became the main incubators for extremist Sunni movements.
Things were already getting more and more out of hand before the explosion of extreme Islamic movements in neighboring Syria. That disaster only added fuel to the fire, as extremists fighting the Assad government began to infiltrate Iraq — especially in al-Anbar and Nineveh, the two Iraqi provinces that border Syria.
