The challenge of fighting Lashkar-e-Toiba
groups that espouse the cause of a global jihad. Although this point remains in dispute, some claim that Lashkar members have been responsible for attacks within Pakistan as retribution for that country’s cooperation with the United States. This last factor makes it all the more difficult for Pakistan to cut off Lashkar- for fear that the group will then focus its wrath on its former benefactor.
Whether or not there was any state sanction of the Mumbai attacks, it is clear that Lashkar operates in Pakistan with impunity. After the ban of 2002, the LeT simply regrouped as Jammat-ud-Dawa (JuD), which has not been proscribed in Pakistan. This is something that is of great concern to India, as well as the United States. The group remains implacably opposed to India. India, in turn, continues to be a relatively easy target because of its porous nautical and land borders with Pakistan. For the United States, Pakistan’s continuing relationship with LeT- whether in the form of direct support or tacit tolerance- carries significant security implications. Emboldened by the operational success of 26/11, and looking for new jihadi causes, Lashkar might well start undertaking more attacks against the U.S. and other Western targets.While the government of Pakistan might have scaled back its support to such groups, it seems unable and unwilling to effectively control them.
What can be done to weaken Lashkar/JuD? First, transnational intelligence and counterterrorism operations are vital, since the group has proven to be active in a number of countries. Second, it is important to make such extremism less relevantto the group’s Pakistani benefactors. For its part, India has resumed wide-ranging negotiations with Pakistan after a break following the Mumbai attacks. It is continuing to press Pakistan to dismantle terrorist groups based on its soil. The reality, however, is that India has little, if any, leverage over Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. A possible path to reconciliation is increasing economic and trade linkages between the two countries. This is something that is being attempted, although progress has been very slow.
Perhaps the most important pressure point for the Pakistani government is that Lashkar, and groups like it, pose a threat to the country’s own integrity, safety and international standing. Substantial sections of Pakistani society are themselves questioning the establishment’s support to extremist groups. This is evidenced, for example, by the runaway success of the satirical Pakistani pop song, Aalu Anday, which excoriates the country’s political leadership. Building up internal opposition, along with sustained international pressure, are quite possibly the strongest weapons to use against Lashkar-e-Toiba.
Bidisha Biswas is an associate professor of political science at Western Washington University. Her work focuses on international security issues with a particular focus on civil conflict, terrorism, border security, and diaspora politics.
